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Footnotes 
1. Most witness identifications are based on visual perception, hence
eyewitness identifications. However, some identifications are
based on other sensory modalities, especially auditory percep-
tion—often referred to as earwitness identifications. We therefore
use the more general term witness identification unless discussing
eyewitness or earwitness identification specifically.
2. Many, if not most, false convictions undoubtedly go undetected.
Nonetheless, those that are detected, through DNA testing, show
that over 75% involve mistaken witness identification. Gary L.
Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations
for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 605
(1998); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its
Probative Value, 7 PSYCH. SCI. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 45, 48-9
(2006). For up-to-date figures on DNA exonerations and case
studies on false convictions involving eyewitness testimony, see
The Innocence Project website, http://www.innocenceproject.org.
For a thorough summary of the research literature on eyewitness
reliability and its legal implications, see State v. Henderson, 208
N.J. 208, 27 A. 3d 872 (2011).
3. For review, see Melissa Boyce et al., Belief of Eyewitness
Identification Evidence, in THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY (VOL. 2): MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 501 (Roderick C. L.
Lindsay et al., eds., 2007); J. Don Read & Sarah L. Desmarais,
Expert Psychology Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A Matter
of Common Sense? in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 115 (Brian L. Cutler, ed., 2009).
4. Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and
Believe about Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED COG. PSYCH. 427
(2004). Judicial misconceptions about witness-identification tes-
timony have been found in samples of non-American judges as
well. See Pär A. Granhag et al., Eyewitness Testimony: Tracing the
Beliefs of Swedish Professionals,” 23 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 709 (2005)
(Swedish judges); Svein Magnussen et al., What Judges Know
About Eyewitness Testimony: A Comparison of Norwegian and U.S.
Judges, 14 PSYCH., CRIME & LAW 177 (2008) (Norwegian judges);
Richard A. Wise et al., A Comparison of Chinese Judges’ and U.S.
Judges’ Knowledge and Beliefs About Eyewitness Testimony, 16
PSYCH., CRIME & LAW 695 (2010) (Chinese judges).
5. Although judges cannot, of course, introduce new evidence when
instructing the jury, they can nonetheless instruct jurors on the
weight to give different elements of an identifying witness’s testi-
mony. Indeed, part of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s mandate in
Henderson, supra note, was to do just that. The new instructions
have recently been promulgated and take effect on September 4,
2012. See Benjamin Weiser, New Jersey Court Issues Guidance for
Juries about Reliability of Eyewitnesses, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012).
6. See generally Tanja R. Benton et al., Has Eyewitness Research
Penetrated the American Legal System? A Synthesis of Case History,
Juror Knowledge, and Expert Testimony, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (VOL. 2): MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 453
(Roderick C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007); David Faigman et al.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY VOL. 2: SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 449 (2005).
7. Lori van Wallandael et al., Mistaken Identification = Erroneous
Conviction? Assessing and Improving Legal Safeguards, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (VOL. 2): MEMORY FOR
PEOPLE 557 (Roderick C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007); Jennifer L.
Devenport et al., Effectiveness of Traditional Safeguards Against
Erroneous Conviction Arising from Mistaken Eyewitness
Identification,” in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 51 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2009).
8. We would like to thank Ryan Anderson and Jenna Henkes for
their assistance in conducting the studies.
One of the most important things a judge does whenpresiding over a jury trial is instruct jurors on the law.No doubt judges themselves are well-versed in the law,
and the language of jury instructions is the source of much
pre-deliberation wrangling on the part of the attorneys. Yet
once judges settle on proper instructions, how effectively do
they communicate the law to jurors? What can courts do to
make jury instructions more effective? Do judges’ nonverbal
actions, as well as their words, influence jury decisions? 
These questions come up in any jury trial, but they are par-
ticularly important in trials relying heavily on witness-identifi-
cation testimony,1 for six reasons. First, misidentifications are
the most common cause of false convictions.2 Second, jurors
have strong intuitions about the factors that make witness
identifications more or less accurate, and many of those intu-
itions are erroneous.3 Third, judges themselves have limited
knowledge about the factors that do and do not affect identifi-
cation accuracy.4 Fourth, a vast amount of empirical research
has been conducted on witness identification, giving judges a
unique opportunity to guide juror decision making so that it
comports with relevant data on the issue.5 Fifth, testimony
about witness identifications can often be quite technical—
especially if it involves expert testimony, as these cases increas-
ingly do—placing challenges on juror decision making.6 And
sixth, traditional procedural safeguards designed to reduce
false identifications and convictions—such as voir dire,
motions to suppress suggestive identifications, and cross-
examination—have only limited effectiveness.7 Thus, judges
are well situated to aid jurors in making proper use of witness-
identification testimony.
The purpose of this article is to review psychological
research on the impact of jury instructions regarding witness
identification, and to present data from several experiments we
recently conducted on the topic.8 Part I covers the issue of
jurors’ comprehension of judges’ instructions, both generally
and with regard to identification issues in particular, and con-
cerning nonverbal as well as verbal behavior. Part II presents
the results of three jury-simulation studies examining the
effect of different kinds of jury instructions about witness-
identification testimony. Finally, Part III summarizes the liter-
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9. See  generally Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the
Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 454-58 (2006);
Prof. Marder provides a cogent analysis of the reasons why jury
instructions have remained resistant to change, as well as innova-
tive approaches to improving jury instructions. See also Joel D.
Lieberman, The Psychology of the Jury Instruction Process, in JURY
PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESS: PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
COURTROOM, VOL. 1, 129 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss
eds., 2009).
10. E.g., Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death
Matters: A Preliminary Study of California’s Capital Penalty
Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 411 (1994); Richard L.
Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in
Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 455 (1995); Carolyn
Semmler & Neil Brewer, Using a Flow-Chart to Improve
Comprehension of Jury Instructions, 9 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & LAW
262 (2002); Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion in
Capital Murder Cases: The Role of Declarative and Procedural
Knowledge, 10 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 516 (2004).
11. Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law in Real
Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539 (1992); Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993).
12. Reifman et al., supra note 11, at 544. Participants were surveyed
shortly after their service was over.
13. Id. at 546-49. Notably, the questions were true-false, so participants
should have been able to score 50% correct merely by chance.
14. The seminal study was conducted by Robert P. Charrow & Veda
R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUMBIA L. REV.
1306 (1979). For review, see Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales,
What Social Science Teaches Us about the Jury Instruction Process, 3
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 589 (1997); Michael T. Nietzel et al.,
Juries: The Current State of the Empirical Literature, in PSYCHOLOGY
& LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 23 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds.,
1999); Lieberman, supra note 9.
15. Semmler & Brewer, supra note 10; Wiener et al., Guided Jury
Discretion, supra note 10.
16. AM. BAR ASSOC’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS (2005).
Several of the principles address juror understanding, but the
most directly relevant is Principle 14: “The court should instruct
the jury in plain and understandable language regarding the
applicable law and the conduct of deliberations.” Id. at 20-21.
17. See Marder, supra note 9, at 475-81. Marder discusses the experi-
ence of several states, but she focuses on California’s “plain-lan-
guage” effort, which is probably the most ambitious attempt to
date.
18. See generally Peter D. Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice:
Judges’ Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Trials, 38
STANFORD L. REV. 89 (1985); Robert Rosenthal, Covert
Communication in Classrooms, Clinics, Courtrooms, and Cubicles,
57 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 839 (2002).
19. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 846.
20. Andrea M. Halvorsen et al., Reducing the Biasing Effects of Judges’
Nonverbal Behavior with Simplified Jury Instruction, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 590 (1997).
21. Id. at 595.
22. Id. It is also noteworthy that the authors did not observe an effect
of judges’ nonverbal behaviors when the mock jurors were stu-
dents, as opposed to nonstudent adults. Id. at 594. Thus, those
most likely to serve on actual juries—non-students—are most
likely to be affected by judge’s demeanor.
ature and offers recommendations for judges dealing with
cases involving witness identifications.
JURORS’ COMPREHENSION OF INSTRUCTIONS
General Comprehension
Empirical research consistently demonstrates that jurors
often struggle to comprehend judges’ instructions.9 This has
been found in both mock-jury studies10 and in post-trial inter-
views of actual jurors.11 For example, Reifman and colleagues
surveyed over 200 Michigan citizens summoned for jury duty,
comparing those who served on criminal trials, civil trials, and
those who ended up not serving.12 They questioned partici-
pants on various aspects of procedural and substantive law.
Performance varied somewhat depending on case and question
type, but overall it was less than 50%, and in some instances
jurors who actually received judges’ instructions performed no
better than uninstructed participants.13
Several jury-simulation studies have found that simplifying
jury instructions significantly improves jurors’ comprehen-
sion.14 The revising efforts rely primarily on techniques such as
using shorter sentences, replacing passive with active voice,
simplifying vocabulary and reading difficulty, and eliminating
legal jargon. Some studies have also found a benefit from
including instructional aids such as flowcharts.15 The success
of these empirical studies led the American Bar Association to
promote revising jury instructions for greater comprehensibil-
ity,16 and several states have recently overhauled their jury
instructions in part or in whole.17
Judges’ Nonverbal Behaviors
These studies show clearly that
the exact language judges use to
deliver jury instructions influ-
ences jurors’ comprehension. But
what about the things that judges
do not say, that is, their demeanor
and nonverbal behavior? It is a
well-known psychological phe-
nomenon that communicators’
expectations, transmitted nonver-
bally, can unintentionally affect
others’ responses to the mes-
sage.18 Jurors are not immune to
such effects.19 For example,
Andrea Halvorsen and colleagues
conducted a jury-simulation experiment that varied the judge’s
expectation regarding the defendant’s guilt: The judge believed
the defendant to be either guilty or not guilty.20 Although the
instructions were identical in both conditions, adult (non-stu-
dent) mock jurors were more likely to find the defendant guilty
when the judge believed the defendant to be guilty (79.2%)
than when the judge believed the defendant was not guilty
(66.7%).21 As the instructions were the same, the only possible
explanation is that judges somehow conveyed their expectation
via their demeanor. Importantly, the effect of judges’ nonverbal
behaviors was greater when they read standard jury instruc-
tions than when they read instructions that had been revised for
greater comprehensibility.22 Other research has found that
“S]tudies show
[the] language
judges use to
deliver jury
instructions
influences jurors’
comprehension.
But what about
the things that
judges do 
not say...?”
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23. Marisa E. Collett & Margaret B. Kovera, The Effects of British and
American Trial Procedures on the Quality of Juror Decision-Making,
27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 403, 415-16 (2003).
24. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
25. Devenport et al., supra note 7, at 62.
26. See Benton et al., supra note 6, at 475-85.
27. Meta-analysis is a statistical technique by which relevant compar-
isons within similar studies are statistically aggregated to deter-
mine their overall effect.  
28. Nietzel et al., supra note 14, at 35 (Table 2.4). This meta-analytic
study compared “enhanced” to standard jury instructions, where
enhanced instructions included efforts to improve comprehensi-
bility, as well as other attempts to heighten the instructions’
impact (e.g., through multiple deliveries).
29. Id., at 35-36. 
30. Edie Greene, Judge’s Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony:
Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 252 (1988).
31. Id.
32. Id. These findings—that Telfaire instructions increase juror skep-
ticism but do not sensitize jurors to relevant evidence—have been
replicated elsewhere. See Gabriella Ramirez et al., Judges’
Cautionary Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AMER. J.
FORENSIC PSYCH. 31 (1996). 
33. For example, Bollingmo and colleagues found that an instruction
informing participants that a victim-witness’s emotional expres-
sion is not a reliable cue to her credibility lessened the impact of
variations in the witness’s emotional expression. Guri Bollingmo
et al., The Effect of Biased and Non-biased Information on Judgments
of Witness Credibility, 15 PSYCH., CRIME & LAW 61 (2009).
Importantly, the witness was giving a statement during a police
interview, not testifying at trial; and the instruction came from the
experimenter, not the judge. Nonetheless, the content of her state-
ment—a description of an alleged rape scenario—was essentially
the same as what her trial testimony would have been, and
observers’ evaluation of the witness’s credibility was comparable
to the sort of credibility judgment that jurors would make at trial.
34. All studies were jury simulations, in which student participants
adopted the role of jurors and were presented with abbreviated case
facts and jury instructions. The trial was presented in written for-
mat, and data were collected online. These methodological charac-
teristics—especially the use of student mock jurors, abbreviated
trial materials, and online data collection—might raise questions
about the relevance of the findings to how “real” jurors decide
“real” cases. These are legitimate concerns, but they are beyond the
scope of the present article. Although little research shows that such
characteristics influence juror decision making, there is a paucity of
research that addresses the issue. See Brian H. Bornstein, The
Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out? 23 LAW
judge’s nonverbal behavior influ-
ences mock jurors’ perceptions of
defendant liability in civil cases as
well.23
These studies demonstrate that
a judges’ demeanor can influence
trial outcomes, which is obviously
undesirable. The question remains
whether a judges’ demeanor can be
used for a good end, namely, to
enhance jurors’ comprehension or
to improve their application of
instructions. Our second study,
described infra, explores this possibility.
Comprehension of Witness-Identification Instructions
The studies discussed thus far concern simplifying instruc-
tions generally, and not instructions about witness-identifica-
tion testimony in particular. In identification cases, defense
counsel can request a cautionary instruction that addresses
concerns about identification accuracy. The best-known such
instruction derives from United States v. Telfaire.24 The Telfaire
instructions direct jurors to consider a limited number of spe-
cific factors when evaluating eyewitness testimony, such as
opportunity to observe the perpetrator, strength of the identi-
fication, viewing conditions that may have influenced the
identification, and the witness’s overall credibility.25
Importantly, the instructions identify these factors, but they do
not explain how they influence eyewitness memory. For exam-
ple, they direct jurors to consider the witness’s opportunity to
observe, but they fail to go further and explain that better
opportunity to observe is associated with more reliable mem-
ory. Some of these factors might seem like common sense, but,
as mentioned previously, jurors’ commonsense notions about
eyewitness behavior are often erroneous.26
Two issues come up with respect to instructions about iden-
tification witnesses. First, how well do jurors understand the
instructions? Second, what effect do the instructions have on
jurors’ decisions in cases that feature an identification witness?
With respect to the first question, a meta-analysis27 conducted
by Nietzel and colleagues found that revised instructions
improved mock jurors’ memory for the instructions, though
not their memory for trial facts.28 There is some evidence that
revised instructions are particularly effective at moderating
jurors’ evaluations of eyewitnesses.29
Professor Edie Greene conducted a series of jury simulation
studies to examine the second question.30 Greene compared
the standard Telfaire instructions to a revised Telfaire condi-
tion, which used simpler language and explained how various
factors influence eyewitness memory, as well as to a control
condition with no cautionary instructions. There was little dif-
ference between the control and standard Telfaire conditions;
however, the revised Telfaire instructions made mock jurors
more skeptical about eyewitness testimony, and they also had
a better understanding of eyewitness memory.31 Neither set of
instructions helped participants distinguish between good and
poor eyewitnesses.32 However, other research has found that
instructions about which factors specifically influence witness
credibility do moderate the influence of witness testimony.33
Thus, there is some cause for cautious optimism that instruc-
tions dealing specifically with witness-identification testimony
can improve juror decision making.
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
We conducted a series of mock-jury studies to examine dif-
ferent means of improving jurors’ comprehension and applica-
tion of witness-identification instructions. The techniques
included rewriting the instructions, adding written instruc-
tions, and varying the judge’s demeanor while delivering the
instructions.34 In addition to requesting a verdict, we assessed
“[Can judges’
demeanor] be
used... to
enhance jurors’
comprehension
or to 
improve their
application of
instructions[?]”
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& HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999) (discussing mock-juror and trial-presen-
tation characteristics); Kevin M. O’Neil et al., Web-based Research:
Methodological Variables’ Effects on Dropout and Sample
Characteristics, 25 BEHAV. RES. METHODS, INSTRUMENTS, & COMPUTERS
217 (2003) (discussing online research methods); Brian H.
Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. UNIV. L.
REV. 443 (2005) (discussing real versus mock-juror decisions). 
35. The studies did not include an objective measure of comprehen-
sion.
36. Greene, supra note 30.
37. Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions that
Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 198
(1984).
38. E.g., Devenport et al., supra note 7, at 62.
39. Earwitness identification refers to “the process of a witness hear-
ing the voice(s) of a perpetrator(s) and encoding that information
in memory, retrieving the stored information when called to
describe the speaker’s voice and/or identify the speaker in a voice
lineup, and finally, testifying or communicating those responses to
a police officer, trial judge, and/or jury.” A. Daniel Yarmey, The
Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY (VOL. 2): MEMORY FOR
PEOPLE 101 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007), at 101.
40. “In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his
perception through the use of his senses. Usually the witness iden-
tifies an offender by the sense of sight—but this is not necessarily
so, and he may use other senses.” United States v Telfaire, supra
note 24 at 559.
41. United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 868 (S.D.Tex. 2003). In
Angleton, the court was asked to rule regarding which aspects of
an expert witness’s testimony about the factors important for ear-
witness-identification accuracy were admissible in court. The
court accepted testimony about the negative effects of an identifi-
cation sample that is too long, the influence of conversations the
identifier had before identification, and the preference of using an
audio lineup versus a single voice. The court rejected testimony
about preexisting beliefs, the identifier’s familiarity with target,
the quality of the recording, and the influence of the police dur-
ing the identification.
42. This is often referred to as “sensitizing” jurors to the evidence. See
Devenport et al., supra note 7; Greene, supra note 30. Put another
way, revised instructions work if they reduce arbitrariness and
improve jurors’ application of the law and reliance on relevant evi-
dence. See Shari S. Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists,
Juries, and Judges, 48 AMER. PSYCHOL. 423 (1993). Presumably,
simplified jury instructions have this effect via better comprehen-
sion, an assumption for which there is some empirical support.
See Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion, supra note 10.
Of course, if revised instructions reduced jurors’ ability to apply
the law correctly, then that would be a compelling argument
against the revision.
43. F(1,91)=4.06, p=.047.
subjective comprehension, using the same three items in all of
the studies.35 Specifically, participants were asked how confi-
dent they were that they had followed the judge’s instructions,
how much difficulty they had in understanding the judge’s
instructions, and how effective the instructions were in help-
ing them reach their verdict.  
Study 1
The first study evaluated the method of simplifying Telfaire
instructions used in Greene’s work,36 and we compared this to
modifying the instructions further to present specific informa-
tion more directly relevant to the task at hand for the jury.
Although pattern instructions have the advantage of reducing
the likelihood of reversal on appeal,37 they are often criticized
as not fitting the considerations of the current case.38 The
Telfaire instructions provide a perfect example of this because
although they are most often thought of as eyewitness instruc-
tions, they are also applicable to other forms of sensory-witness
identification, like earwitness identification.39 Specifically, they
contain a statement that addresses the possibility that other
senses may be used.40 The present study therefore investigated
the applicability of Telfaire and modified Telfaire instructions to
a case involving earwitness, rather than eyewitness, testimony.
To compare these different instruction-improvement meth-
ods, 201 undergraduate students read an online trial summary
involving a home invasion in which the victim heard (but did
not see) the defendant. The victim and a police officer testified
about a voice lineup in which the victim identified the defen-
dant as the perpetrator. Participants then read reasonable-
doubt instructions and one of three versions of sensory-wit-
ness instructions (or a no-instruction control). To replicate
Greene’s work, one-quarter of participants were presented with
the standard Telfaire instruc-
tions, and another quarter
were presented with the
Telfaire instructions as simpli-
fied by Greene. To compare
this approach to a modifica-
tion containing information
more specific to earwitness
identification, another quarter
of the participants saw the
Telfaire instructions modified
to include the legally admissi-
ble issues involved with assessing earwitness identifications.41
The remaining quarter of the participants saw no identification
instructions and read only the instructions about reasonable
doubt. 
We also created two versions of the instructions in which
witnessing conditions (e.g., perpetrator’s voice disguise and the
delay between the crime and the identification) were either
more or less likely to elicit a correct identification. We did this
because it is important to assess the impact of the instructions
not only on comprehension itself, but also on jurors’ use of evi-
dence presented at trial. Ideally, simplified instructions should
improve jurors’ use of evidence; in the present trial, that would
mean relying more on the identification evidence when the
witnessing conditions were conducive to good memory for the
perpetrator than when they were not.42 After reading the ran-
domly assigned instructions, participants were asked to return
verdicts and complete subjective measures of comprehension. 
Analyses indicated that although participants felt more con-
fident in their verdict with the modified instructions than with
standard Telfaire instructions,43 there were no other differences
“[We] investigated
the applicability
of Telfaire...
instructions to a
case involving
earwitness, rather
than eyewitness,
testimony.”
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44. Participants who received written instructions were split further
into two different conditions: one that heard the instructions
orally both before and after trial, and one that heard oral instruc-
tions only after the trial. These two groups are combined into a
single “written-instructions” condition for present purposes.
45. See notes 18-23, supra, and accompanying text.
46. A pretest showed that participants found the encouraging judge
significantly more friendly, encouraging, supportive, fair, kind, and
approachable, and less stern and impatient, than the stoic judge.
47. F(1,129)=5.42, p = .021.
48. Of the participants who saw the good witnessing condition and
the written instructions, 10% convicted. Of the participants who
saw the poor witnessing condition and the written instructions,
39% convicted. Such a “desensitization” effect, if corroborated by
additional research, would be quite troubling.
49. Of the participants in the good witnessing condition, 25% con-
victed, compared to 19% in the poor witnessing condition.
50. 20% of participants convicted in the stoic condition, whereas 29%
convicted in the encouraging condition: F(1,131)=1.38, p = .24. 
51. E.g., Cathy W. Hall et al., Psychology of Computer Use: XXXIII.
Interactive Instructions with College-Level Science Courses, 76
PSYCHOL. REPORTS 963 (1995). Interactive instructions are instruc-
tions that are intended to move the learner from a passive to an
active role by requiring his or her input to proceed, much like the
questions that required a response in the current study. 
52. Confidence in following instructions, F(1,90) = 1.23, p = .27; dif-
ficulty in understanding instructions, F(1,89) = .004, p = .95;
effectiveness of the instructions, F(1,89) = .001, p = .97 
53. F(1,84) = 2.961, p = .09
by instruction condition on any
other measure of subjective com-
prehension. Additionally, the
instructions did not have an
effect on the mock jurors’ verdict,
nor did they sensitize them to
good-vs.-poor witnessing condi-
tions.
Study 2
A second study was conducted to evaluate how the presen-
tation of the instructions might affect jurors’ subjective experi-
ence with them. To better approximate the conditions under
which jurors experience trials, jury instructions were video-
taped and presented either with or without written transcripts
for the participant’s reference. One hundred and forty-one par-
ticipants were asked to read either the good or poor witnessing
version of the same trial summary used in the above study and
then presented with the general jury instructions regarding
their application of the law. Participants were also randomly
assigned to receive or not receive written versions of the
instructions and then asked to return verdicts and rate the
instructions.44
This study also examined the effects of the judge’s nonver-
bal communication. Because some research has shown that the
judge’s general demeanor can have an effect on the jury,45 two
versions of the jury instructions were videotaped and shown to
participants. In the first version, which we refer to as the
encouraging condition, the judge presented himself as inter-
ested and engaged in the trial and used language manipulated
to be encouraging to the jury (e.g., “It is extremely important
that you perform your duties,” and, “While the information
presented here today may seem overwhelming, I appreciate
your commitment to this trial.”). In the second condition, called
the stoic condition, the judge acted somewhat disinterested in
the case, refrained from using encouraging speech, and empha-
sized the imperatives in the instructions (e.g., “You must per-
form your duties,” and “You will not be concerned...”).46
Analyses uncovered no significant effects of whether the
participant was given written instructions on subjective
instruction ratings. However, they did uncover a significant
interaction with the witnessing condition on the measure of
verdict,47 such that participants who were able to reference a
written version of the instructions were significantly more
likely to convict the defendant in the poor witnessing condi-
tion, indicating that the written version of the instructions
actually decreased sensitivity to the relevant identification fac-
tors.48 Contrastingly, the verdicts of participants who did not
have the written instructions were not significantly affected by
the witnessing condition.49
No significant effects were identified for the judge’s nonver-
bal communication. Participants were equally likely to convict
regardless of whether they saw the stoic or encouraging
instructions.50 There was also no interaction of the stoic-vs.-
encouraging instructions with the good-vs.-bad witnessing
conditions, indicating that the judge’s demeanor did not
improve mock jurors’ decision making by making them more
sensitive to the witness-identification testimony. 
Study 3
Finally, because some research has shown that interactive
presentation of material increases its usefulness,51 we con-
ducted a third study to assess the effect of adding interactive
instructions. One hundred and two participants again read
either the good or poor witnessing version of the trial sum-
mary, followed by the same videotaped instructions from the
second study, which again either were or were not accompa-
nied by a written transcript. This time, however, the instruc-
tions were also manipulated either to include or not include
interactive instructions, creating a 2 (good-vs.-poor witness-
ing condition) by 2 (with or without interactive instructions)
by 2 (with or without the accompanying written transcript)
design. In the interactive-instruction condition, the video was
cut into sections, each of which was immediately followed by
a single multiple-choice question. Participants were unable to
continue until they provided the correct answer. This method
highlighted specific parts of the instructions relevant to their
decision (e.g., burden of proof, reasonable doubt) and was
expected to improve mock jurors’ subjective experience and
comprehension. 
Analyses again showed that the availability of written
instructions did not affect participants’ subjective estimate of
comprehension.52 Also, in contrast to Study 2, the written
instructions did not desensitize participants to differences in
the quality of the witness-identification testimony.53 Analyses
regarding the interactive-instructions manipulation indicated
“[W]e conducted
a third study 
to assess the
effect of adding 
interactive
instructions.”
52 Court Review - Volume 48 
54. F(1,89) =5.31, p=.024.
55. Participants convicted less with interactive instructions (22%)
than without (41%), F(1,86)=3.79, p=.055.
56. Study 2 even found a desensitization effect, where written instruc-
tions made mock jurors worse at discriminating between good and
poor identification witnesses. Because Study 3 did not replicate this
finding, we consider it an anomaly and not a cause for concern.
57. It seems unlikely that simple modifications, such as simplifying
complex language, would have a detrimental effect on jury deci-
sion making. However, other modifications could. For example,
the inclusion of written and/or interactive instructions might con-
fuse jurors, and the judge’s demeanor could inadvertently send
nonverbal cues affecting jurors’ judgments (see notes 18-23,
supra, and accompanying text).
58. For example, jurors who feel better about their jury service will be
less likely to try and get out of jury duty in the future, and will
also generally show higher levels of civic engagement.
59. See notes 14-17, supra, and accompanying text.
60. On innovations in jury instructions generally, see Marder, supra
note 9.
61. See Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion, supra note 10.
62. See notes 24-33, supra, and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Boyce et al., supra note 3; Read & Desmarais, supra note 3.
64. On safeguards generally, and their pros and cons relative to expert
testimony, see Henderson, supra note 2; see also van Wallandael et
al., supra note 7; Devenport et al., supra note 7.
that although participants who saw the interactive instructions
perceived them as being significantly more effective,54 there
was only a marginally significant main effect on verdict55 and
no interaction with witnessing condition.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of the present studies are largely consistent
with other research on jurors’ comprehension of jury instruc-
tions. Specifically, various revisions to the instructions—such
as modifying the language, providing written as well as oral
instructions, and including interactive instructions—had
slight effects on mock jurors’ subjective comprehension of the
instructions, but these effects were not consistent across stud-
ies or measures. The modifications did not exert an overall
effect on verdicts, but even more importantly—and distress-
ingly—they also did not, by and large, sensitize mock jurors to
relevant variations in trial testimony (i.e., good vs. bad wit-
nessing conditions).56 When the judge delivered instructions
in a friendlier and more approachable manner, mock jurors
perceived the judge more favorably; but the judge’s demeanor
likewise did not influence their verdicts or make them more
sensitive to identification witness testimony.
Importantly, we observed almost no evidence that these
modifications to jury instructions made mock jurors’ decisions
worse.57 There is a clear benefit to making jurors feel that they
understand the instructions better, even if that perception is
not borne out in their verdicts.58 Moreover, much research
indicates that revising jury instructions leads to better objec-
tive comprehension as well.59 Thus, modifying instructions
would seem to be well worth the effort; although some inno-
vations are costly, such as completely rewriting a jurisdiction’s
pattern jury instructions, others—such as making instructions
interactive—are not.60
The trickier problem is in modifying instructions not only
to improve comprehension—whether that is measured subjec-
tively or objectively—but also to improve the quality of jurors’
decision making. There is some evidence that this can occur,
as with revising capital jury instructions;61 however, the
research on modifying instructions about witness identifica-
tion has generally failed to accomplish this goal,62 and the pre-
sent studies do not afford a much more optimistic conclusion.
Identification might be particularly difficult to address via
instructions because of jurors’ strong, yet often erroneous,
intuitions about the topic.63 Therefore, it might be necessary to
educate jurors about the fallibility of identification witnesses
in more detail, by incorporating into jury instructions the sorts
of information that more commonly arise in expert testi-
mony.64 In light of the severe consequences of false identifica-
tions and resulting false convictions, further efforts on the part
of judges to sensitize jurors to the vagaries of identification tes-
timony would be highly worthwhile.
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